This paper provides su¢ cient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by …nite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.
Equilibrium and evolution
The concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) is a cornerstone of game theory. From a dynamic point of view, (some) Nash equilibria can be justi…ed by evolutionary processes, which usually appeal to an in…nitely large population of players. A reduction of such a dynamic approach to a static equilibrium notion is conceptualized in the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) . Scha¤er (1989) proposed a generalization of the ESS concept to a …nite population of players, calling it (symmetric) evolutionary equilibrium (EE). 1 Dynamic foundations for the EE concept were discussed in Scha¤er (1989) and further support for it under imitation dynamics is provided by e.g. VegaRedondo (1997) and Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005a) . Scha¤er (1989) and others (e.g. Vega-Redondo, 1996, Ch. 2; Tanaka, 2000; Hehenkamp et al., 2004) have shown that evolutionary equilibria generally di¤er from Nash equilibria, illustrating this on the examples of quantity and price oligopolies, and rent-seeking games. The reason for the di¤erence is that in EE players maximize relative payo¤s. Nevertheless, there are games in which EE and NE are related (e.g. Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005b) . Ania (2008) identi…es constant-sum games and games with weak payo¤ externalities as classes of games where EE and NE predictions coincide. 2 We ask how far one can go to generalize the previous results on the equivalence or di¤erence of evolutionary and Nash equilibria. We provide su¢ cient and partially necessary conditions on the payo¤ function for a symmetric game to have sets of EE and NE coincide. Our …rst theorem extends Ania's (2008) result. It is su¢ cient for the equivalence of EE and NE that a game exhibits versions of competitiveness (which generalizes constant-sum) or of weak payo¤ externality properties at symmetric strategy pro…les. Each pro…le needs to satisfy only one of the properties for unilateral deviations, and for non-equilibrium pro…les only pro…table deviations need to be considered. Our second theorem shows that these two properties are also necessary for the equivalence, at least at equilibrium pro…les.
We illustrate the economic relevance of our results by means of examples, including Bertrand competition with constant unit cost and games with continuous payo¤ functions, which cover other oligopoly games.
De…nitions and notation
We investigate a model where a set I = f1; : : : ; ng of individuals play a symmetric n-person game = (I; fX i g i=I ; f i g i=I g, where X i denotes the strategy set of player i, X := n i=1 X i the set of joint strategies pro…les, and i : X ! R denotes the payo¤ function of player i. Symmetry requires that the strategy sets of the players coincide (X i = X j for all i, j), and that the payo¤ functions satisfy i (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) = (i) (x (1) ; : : : ; x (n) ) for any permutation of I. We do not impose any further assumptions on X or on i . Let G denote the class of games under consideration and let [a]
n ) is a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of game if
The set of all symmetric pure Nash equilibria in game is denoted by X N . We call a symmetric strategy pro…le x = ( [a] n ) an evolutionary equilibrium of game if
The set of all evolutionary equilibria in game is denoted by X E . By symmetry of the game, we have
) for all i 6 = 1: Accordingly, the latter de…nition compares payo¤s of di¤erent players after a deviation by one player from a to b. In the evolutionary interpretation, if a deviator to b has higher payo¤ than the players that stay at a, then a is not viable and thus ([a] n ) cannot constitute an evolutionary equilibrium. Let x 2 X be an arbitrary strategy pro…le and let x i denote the pro…le in which x i i 6 = x i , while x i j = x j for j 6 = i; i.e. x i = (x 1 ; : : : ; x i 1 ; x i i ; x i+1 ; : : : ; x n ). Consider a game 2 G. We say (a) game has a weak payo¤ externality between x and x i and between players i and j if
and (b) game has weak payo¤ externalities if (WPE) holds for all x, x i and for all pairs of players (i; j), j 6 = i.
The concept of weak payo¤ externality appears in Ania (2008), who uses the global part (b) of the de…nition. The concept means that when player i changes strategy, the e¤ect on his/her own payo¤ is larger than the e¤ect on the payo¤ of any other player j. Weak payo¤ externality can be seen as a generalization of the "smallness" property in large games or competitive markets where a player cannot a¤ect others'payo¤s by much.
We say (a) game is weakly competitive between x and x i and between players i and j if
and (b) game is weakly competitive if for all x, x i and all players i, there exists player j 6 = i such that (WC) holds.
The de…nition extends the notion of a strictly competitive game to the general n-player case, n 2.
3 If player i wins from a deviation, then at least one other player does not win. If player i loses from a deviation, at least one player does not lose. Observe that the class of weakly competitive games includes constant-sum games as a special case.
Parts (b) of the two de…nitions require the respective property to hold globally in a game. For our purposes it will be su¢ cient that the properties hold locally between symmetric pro…les and some unilateral deviations from them.
Su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium equivalence
Our …rst result provides su¢ cient conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibria. Then the sets of symmetric pure Nash equilibria and evolutionary equilibria coincide, i.e.
) for i 6 = 1, which violates both (WPE) and (WC). Thus x 2 X E .
and
n ) for i 6 = 1, which contradicts (WPE) and (WC). Thus x = 2 X E .
Corollary 1 Let 2 G be weakly competitive. Then X N = X E .
The theorem generalizes the results in Ania (2008, Propositions 1 and 2) in three ways. First, the constant-sum property is replaced by the much weaker property of weak competitiveness. Second, the properties of weak competitiveness and weak payo¤ externalities need to hold only at symmetric strategy pro…les, and for pro…les that are not Nash equilibria, only for pro…table one-player deviations. Third, the two properties can be locally substituted for each other. Accordingly, the theorem also covers games that neither are weakly competitive nor display weak payo¤ externalities globally, but that locally possess a mixture of the two properties. The following examples illustrate this.
Example 1 Game that is neither weakly competitive nor has weak payo¤ externalities, but that satis…es the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Consider the symmetric three-person game with payo¤ matrices (Player 3 chooses between matrices) 3: 1n2 1; 1; 1 3; 0; 3 0; 3; 3 6; 6; 9
3: 1n2
3; 3; 0 9; 6; 6 6; 9; 6 5; 5; 5 . Pro…les ( ; ; ) with payo¤s (3; 3; 0), and ( ; ; ) with payo¤s (6; 9; 6), satisfy neither (WPE) nor (WC). Furthermore, ( ; ; ) and ( ; ; ) violate (WPE) but satisfy (WC), and ( ; ; ) and ( ; ; ) violate (WC) but satisfy (WPE). The game is neither weakly competitive nor does it have weak payo¤ externalities, but by Theorem 1 we have X N = X E (= f( ; ; )g).
Example 2 Bertrand oligopoly with constant unit cost.
Consider a symmetric n-…rm Bertrand oligopoly with market demand Q(p) and cost function C i (q i ) = cq i , for all i = 1; : : : ; n: Firms set prices p i 0 and market demand is shared equally between all …rms that charge the lowest price p min = min i p i . If k is the number of …rms charging the lowest price, then q i (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) = Q p min =k when p i = p min , and q i (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) = 0 otherwise. Firm i's pro…t function is i (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) = q i (p 1 ; : : : ; p n ) (p i c).
Under standard assumptions, there exists a unique symmetric Bertrand equilibrium so that X N = f(c; : : : ; c)g. From the equilibrium pro…le, any unilateral price reduction changes only the payo¤ of the deviating …rm, thus (WPE) is satis…ed. Any unilateral price increase satis…es (WC). From symmetric pro…les with prices below marginal cost, any deviation is weakly competitive. From symmetric pro…les with prices above marginal cost, a unilateral pro…table price reduction makes the payo¤ of all other …rms drop to zero. Thus such a deviation is weakly competitive. Theorem 1 therefore implies that X E = X N = f(c; : : : ; c)g. Note that a weaker version of Theorem 1 requiring one of the properties to hold for all one-player deviations from symmetric pro…les would not be su¢ cient to claim the result because a non-pro…table reduction involving a price above marginal cost satis…es neither (WPE) nor (WC).
Necessary conditions for equilibrium equivalence
The second result identi…es necessary conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in games that are generic in a certain sense. ii) if x = 2 X N = X E , then (WPE) or (WC) (or both) hold between x and x 1 = (b; [a] n 1 ) for players 1 and i, i 6 = 1 for some b such that
, and (WC) or not (WPE) hold for some b such
Suppose that both (WPE) and (WC) are violated between x and
n ) for i 6 = 1 and such b. By symmetry, the inequality is equivalent to 1 (b; [a] n 1 ) 1 ([a] n 1 ; b) for all such b. Suppose now that (WC) is violated and (WPE) holds for all b such that
for all such b. Thus this inequality holds for all b, which contradicts x = 2 X E . The theorem provides means to argue that a given game has evolutionary equilibria di¤erent from Nash equilibria. If Nash equilibria (or some characterization of them) of the game are known, one method is to show that for a given Nash equilibrium both (WPE) and (WC) are violated for some b. Without knowing the equilibria, one way to show that equilibrium equivalence fails is to show that both (WPE) and (WC) are violated for some b for all symmetric pro…les. Alternatively, one can use condition ii) of the theorem to …nd a symmetric pro…le for which (WC) is violated for all b, and (WPE) is violated for all b such that 1 
. The corollary and the example below illustrate these cases.
Corollary 2 Let 2 G be a game with continuous strategy sets X i R and di¤erentiable payo¤ functions i : X ! R. Let x 2 X N represent an isolated interior Nash equilibrium. Then
Proof. Since at equilibrium
The corollary covers continuous games such as Cournot oligopoly or rentseeking contests. In these games, the failure of equivalence is a direct consequence of negative spillovers.
Consider the symmetric two-player game with payo¤ matrix 2; 2 3; 4 2; 3 4; 3 2; 2 1; 0 3; 2 0; 1 0; 0 . In this game, (WC) is violated for all deviations from ( ; ). Also, 1 ( ; ) > 1 ( ; ) and (WPE) is violated between ( ; ) and ( ; ), and 1 ( ; ) < 1 ( ; ) and (WPE) holds between ( ; ) and ( ; ). Thus X E 6 = X N (in fact, X E = f( ; )g and X N = ?).
Conclusion
The sets of (symmetric) evolutionary and Nash equilibria in pure strategies coincide for games that are weakly competitive or that display weak payo¤ externalities at symmetric strategy pro…les. These properties can be locally substituted one for the other, and it is su¢ cient that they apply only to pro…table deviations from non-Nash pro…les (Theorem 1). Although the corresponding class of games may appear narrow, it contains such important classes of games as constant-sum, strictly competitive, and non-atomic games. Bertrand oligopoly with constant unit costs represents an economic example where the full force of the extensions is required to establish equilibrium equivalence. For generic games, the two properties are not only su¢ cient for equilibrium equivalence, but at least one of them is also necessary at equilibrium pro…les and partially necessary at other pro…les (Theorem 2). Therefore, the su¢ cient conditions of weak payo¤ externalities and weak competitiveness (and local combinations thereof) essentially exhaust the properties on (generic) games for which equilibrium equivalence can be expected.
